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This thesis examines the appropriateness of marginal-cost-based principles for pricing 
electricity in deregulated markets. This examination is prompted by the rising concerns about 
the incessant increases in electricity prices; disconnects between costs and prices; social 
equity and justness of prices; and – more broadly – increasing disparity between expected and 
actual outcomes of electricity market reform. While it is true that these outcomes are a result 
of a complex array of factors, this thesis is however premised on the argument that electricity 
pricing practices, based on marginal-cost principles, is a dominant factor in affecting the 
above noted market outcomes. In view of multi-dimensional foci of this research, recourse is 
made to the body of knowledge residing in several academic disciplines (e.g., engineering, 
economics, and public policy) and research methodologies (e.g., historic review, empirical 
research, inferential analysis, and econometrics). The case-examples for this thesis are 
provided by the electricity industries in the developed world (primarily, the US, UK and 
Australia, but – more broadly – Germany and France). The analysis reveals that pricing 
philosophies of the earlier times (from the Aristotelian, to the medieval times) – that are 
precursors to the modern-day pricing practices – quintessentially emphasized considerations 
of social justice and fairness in pricing; profit, rather profiteering, was generally viewed 
unfavourably in those times. The coincidental births (in the mid-to-late 1880s) of the 
electricity industry and neo-classical ideology however appears to have imparted a profit-
seeking ethos to the foundations of the electricity industry. Assisted by rapidly rising (and 
highly, inelastic) electricity demand, technology-innovation-induced economies-of-scale, and 
mutually-symbiotic ‘understanding’ between diverse industry interest (namely, utilities, 
customers, equipment manufacturers, fuel suppliers, regulators, investors, governments), the 
electricity industry – up until the 1960s- continued to earn super-normal profits, while 
maintaining lowering cost and price trends for electricity. These trends however reversed in 
the 1970s, turning the electricity industry into a rising-cost, even faster-rising-prices, and a 
shrinking profit industry. Concomitant with the rise of neo-liberal thinking in the eighties, the 
electricity industry began to be deregulated – in accord with neo-liberal principles. A key 
element of this reform was the re-enforcement of faith in market-discovered, marginal-cost-
based electricity prices – as the best means to achieve allocative efficiency, lower electricity 
costs and prices, and investment-attractive returns (profits). In view however of the 
plateauing of technological advancements in the 1970s and 1980s, availability of alternative 
technologies (e.g., 
iii
low-capital-high-operation-cost gas turbines, renewables), systems (e.g., decentralized), and 
structural and governance arrangements (completion, choice, light-handed incentive 
regulation), marginal cost-based prices failed to deliver on the expectations. The only course 
of action for the industry to recoup capital costs (in this high-capital cost industry) was to 
‘game’ the system, through the abuse of market power, taking advantage of the 
indispensability of electricity. Cost (euphemism for profit) considerations became the motor 
of all major decisions. This sent the system into a disarray – costs became disconnected from 
prices, households bore the brunt of price increases, and the technical integrity of the system 
was compromised. In addition to empirical validation, this research has substantiated these 
claims through econometric analyses. This research further makes a case for developing 
alternative pricing paradigms, underscored by considerations, for example, of continual 
efficiency improvements, incentivizing technology innovations, benchmarking costs to 
improved efficiencies, and - above all – ensuring that social justice and fairness are central to 
the pricing strategies for various segments of society.
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